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Abstract—There is an ever-growing number of users who
duplicate the social media accounts of celebrities or generally
impersonate their presence on online social media as well as
Instagram. Of course, this has led to an increasing interest
in detecting fake profiles and investigating their behaviour.
We begin this research by targeting a few famous politicians,
including Donald J. Trump, Barack Obama, and Emmanuel
Macron and collecting their activity for the period of 3 months
using a specifically-designed crawler across Instagram. We then
experimented with several profile characteristics such as user-
name, display name, biography, and profile picture to identify
impersonator among 1,5M unique users. Using publicly crawled
data, our model was able to distinguish crowds of impersonators
and political bots. We continued by providing an analysis of the
characteristics and behaviour of these impersonators. Finally,
we conclude the analysis by classifying impersonators into four
different categories.
Index Terms—Social Network Analysis; Instagram; Imperson-
ation; Political Bot Detection; Fake profile; User profiling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) are social connections with
similar interests over the Internet. This world also contains
thousands of accounts are impersonating real people, adver-
tising commercial products, criticizing political candidates,
deceptive social media campaigns [1], and sowing discord.
These fake accounts spread false images and misinformation
on many subjects (Figure 1). A New York Times study
in 2018 found that many genuine accounts are copied and
turned into automated bots sold by corporations. Many others
are deployed in systematic information warfare campaigns
conducted by governments [2], [3]. Investigating valuable
hidden insights of OSNs [4] in regard to detecting imposters
and understanding their behaviour is recognised as the hot
research area. Instagram is an online social media platform for
sharing visual media. According to Statistica [5], the mainly
mobile sharing network is one of the most popular OSNs
worldwide and had reached 1 billion active users monthly
by 2018. As a result, numerous prominent public figures that
are hugely active on Twitter uncovered their official accounts
on Instagram. In such a scenario, the analysis of the user
engagement and detecting bots are still an active domain
of research. By considering genuine politician accounts on
Instagram, some interesting questions will arise. What is the
rate of user engagement in their shared media in the shape
of liking and commenting? How many impersonators exist?
and who are they? What is the activity of this group? Are
they human or bot? In this study, “Imposter”, “Impostor”, and
“Impersonator” terms are equal.
A. Impersonation and Social Media Profile Theft (SMPT)
An increasingly popular difficulty on OSNs that individuals
are forced to deal with each day is the impersonation or
Social Media Profile Theft (SMPT) [6]. SMPT takes place
when an impostor sets up a fake profile on social media
which mimics another user as a prank or to mock them. By
using this account, they gain the trust of the original users
followers for different purposes such as fake promotions, to
generate followers, to gather information, spreads political
views, supports or oppose actions etc. Some criminals are
using this strategy to deceive the public and commit crimes.
They attempt to establish relationships using false facts and
then defraud unsuspecting targets. A fake social media account
could result in legal action against the impersonator. On
Instagram, it can be possible to report a fraud.
Fig. 1. Two samples of impersonators of Donald J. Trump on Instagram. The
first snapshot belongs to the genuine account and the others are imposters.
The main contributions of this work are:
• We crawled and built a real dataset of Instagram posts
of 3 months user activities including nearly 5M likes and
500K comments. Around 1,5M unique users are included.
• A novel process to identify impersonators on Instagram
using profile features and users’ activities is introduced.
• Detect a group of impersonator accounts of topmost
politician figures on Instagram and categorize in 4 groups.
• Understand the motivation and activity of different im-
personator accounts and an initial attempt to distinguish
political bot generated impersonation.
The remaining of this study is as follows. Section II gives
the relevant work. The dataset and explanation of data crawling
are described in section III. The methodology of impostor
identification is detailed in section IV. Next, we represent
the user characteristics of imposters on section V and finally,
section VI exposes future directions and concludes the study.
II. RELATED WORK
Recent research has discussed related problems and dedi-
cated a fair amount of work to study OSNs [7]. Bots can alter
the perception of social media influence, artificially enlarging
the audience of some people, or they can ruin the reputation of
a company [8]. The problem of rising social bots are discussed
in [9]. There are various strategies to tackle the problem of
bot detection. [10] suggested a profile-based approach and [11]
proposed a novel framework on detecting spam content. Also,
[12] presented a machine learning pipeline for detecting fake
accounts.
On another line of research, the authors in [13] [14] look
at the profile and behavioural patterns of a user and discussed
existing challenges on different OSNs. By integrating semantic
similarity and existing relationships between users, it is pos-
sible to match profiles across various OSNs [15] [16]. Also,
[17] conducted a detailed investigation of user profiles and
proposed a matching scheme. On Instagram, for the sake of
mitigating impersonation attack, [18] explored fake behaviours
and built an automated mechanism to detect fake activities.
Political bots are automated accounts that are particularly
active on public policy issues, elections, and political crises.
The use of political bots during the UK referendum on EU
membership is explained in [19] and also, [3] [20] described
computational propaganda and define political bots designed
to manipulate public opinion In the US context.
As far as our knowledge, the problem of finding imperson-
ators of top politician figures on social media is not studied
in the literature and this is the first study that analysis this
phenomenon on Instagram.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND CASE STUDIES
A. Crawling
We designed a multi-threaded crawler to collect data from
Instagram and store on a MongoDB server. The crawler
connects to the Instagram API and receives data as a JSON file
(Figure 2.a). The Instagram API Platform can be used to build
non-automated, authentic, high-quality apps and services. The
crawler consists of four modules, a) a post crawler, b) a
comment crawler c) a like crawler, and d) a profile crawler.
Each module executes the task associated with its module
name. In line with Instagram policies and user privacy and
ethical consideration defined by the community, we only
gather publicly available data that are only obtainable from
Instagram. The whole data collection process is designed
exclusively for research purposes and the data is stored in
an anonymized format.
Fig. 2. General architecture of the implemented Crawler and Modeler.
B. Case Studies
Despite major investigations and the suspension of imposter
by Instagram, imposters are still easy to find. We divided the
profiles of genuine figures into different categories and we
limited the scope of the study to the politicians. The logic for
considering politicians is their large impact on OSNs. Almost
everyone is interested in their shared media and the rate of
their being targeted to be imitated also quite high. A vast
majority of the imposter accounts from supporters to bots
are trying to impersonate them in order to promote various
goals. The other potential categories are news agencies and
celebrities. We further narrowed our focus on two top popular
political figures in the USA: Donald J. Trump (@realdon-
aldtrump), the current president of the USA (at the time of
writing this paper), and Barack Obama (@barackobama), the
former president. Additionally, we desired to see how the
perceived findings are applicable for non-USA accounts so
we also selected Emmanuel Macron, the current president
of France (@emmanuelmacron). Particularly, these accounts
are familiar in terms of the numbers of followers, received
comments, and obtained likes.
C. Dataset
The collection process began on 30th December 2018 to
past and stopped 1st October 2018. We collected all of the
published posts in a three-month period. In keeping with our
research purpose and Instagram policies, our principal targets
were posts and the reactions based on them, so in the data
collection period, around 80 Instagram posts, approximately
9M likes, 350K comments, and 1,5M profiles were crawled.
TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATASET
D. Trump B.Obama E. Macron
actual total #post 4,291 258 362
actual total #follower 11,1m 19,5m 1,3m
actual total #followee 8 14 81
#post crawled 37 11 27
total #comment 119.54K 176K 40.3K
total #like 3.3M 5M 888.6K
Total #mentionsa 44.1K 3.238K 19.7K
avg #comment per post 3.2K 16K 1.4K
avg #like per post 89.3K 463K 32.9K
avg #mention per post 1.19K 4,5K 733
avg #comment per user 2.01 2.1 2.02
avg #like per user 3.0 3.4 2.67
crawled user #profilesb 501k 502k 501k
aprofile mentioned in comments. b unique identified profiles.
Table I displays the characteristics of the dataset divided
into several parts. The first part shows the actual number of
posts, followers, and followees of the genuine account for the
whole time-frame. The second part indicates the volume of
data that we intended to study in the period of data collection.
The dataset is thus a small part of the real data. While
Trump shared 37 posts, which is more than others, surprisingly
Obama received more reactions (like and comment). Besides,
the number of users mentioned in the comments is included.
The third part presents the average amount of reactions in
each use-case. On average, Obama got the highest rate in all
features and Macron the least. It can be seen that in Obama’s
case, with regards to the number of posts, users are more
engaged. We presented the average like and comment reactions
per unique user in the fourth part. Stats are from profiles
who left comments or liked the post and we count them once
in cases where they left several comments. For example, on
average, while each user in Trump’s case liked 3 posts, in
Macron liked 2.67 posts.
To be able to perform analysis, for each use case, we
randomly selected 500k unique users and crawled their profiles
which are shown in the last part of the table. These users might
be engaged in one or both reactions (like and comment). As a
result, the total population contains nearly 1,5M profiles. As
the process of crawling profiles is a time-consuming task, a
proper pool of them is assessed for this study.
D. Instagram Characteristics
A profile on Instagram can be public or private. While
in public profiles everything is visible, in private accounts
few profile features are available. There are several ways
to express reactions to a post: a) giving a like, b) posting
comments, c) liking the comments, d) sharing in a shape of
Direct (messaging feature), e) and bookmarking. We rely on
the first two public actions (A and B) to identify the pool of
users who are somehow reacting to the target profiles.
In general, our methodology is simple; make a pool of users
who react to the crawled posts and then compare their public
profiles to the target account.
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF IMPERSONATING ACCOUNTS
After crawling user profiles, here we identify impersonator
accounts and arrange their classification. As a first step, we
pick profile features and by applying the similarity measure,
we can discover and extract similar users for further investi-
gations.
A. Features
• Username is a string that individuals use on Instagram
to define their profile address Composed of 30 symbols.
Username, must contain only letters, numbers, periods
and underscores. For example, the usernames of genuine
accounts in this paper are @realdonaldtrump, @barack-
obama, and @emmanuelmacron.
• Display Name is what shows up on their Profile page, as
well as next to a user’s comments. “President Donald J.
Trump”, “Barack Obama”, and “Emmanuel Macron” are
the Display names of the genuine accounts.
• Biography is a section where users can include informa-
tion about themselves and it is limited to 150 characters.
The biography of our three genuine accounts are “45th
President of the United States”, “Dad, husband, Presi-
dent, citizen”, and “President de la Republique francaise”
respectively. All of these features are shown in Figure 1.
• Profile Picture on Instagram represents the account per-
sonage. This photo, whether a profile is public or private,
is visible to everyone. Impersonator accounts copy the
same (or a very similar) photo as their profile picture. All
three of our politicians have their own clear face photo
as their profile picture.
• Shared Media is the activity of a user in terms of
publishing posts. For example, if someone is duplicating
the post of the genuine account in their profile can be
considered as an imposter.
B. Data Preparation and Cleaning
To make the model, we began with data preparation. We
implemented a system including three main modules, a) a
Database Module, b) a Text Cleaning Module and c) a
Similarity Module (Figure 2. b). The Text Cleaning module
removes duplicated words, punctuation, and emojis then filters
the stop word (English) and tokenizes words containing at least
three characters. These steps are necessary for all Username,
Display Name, and Biography metrics.
The important factor is Username, which is a string with-
out any space characteristic. Some examples are “realdon-
aldtrump” and “itsdonaldtrumppp” (The first one is the gen-
uine Trump username and the other is an imposter). A useful
approach is to extract sub-words from the username. There-
fore, using the “wordninja” (github.com/keredson/wordninja),
we broke down a single meaningless word into several mean-
ingful words. Consequently, “realdonaldtrump” is converted
to “real donald trump” and “itsdonaldtrumppp” to “its donald
trumppp”. Then, we can pass it to the Text Cleaning module. A
final tokenized result would be “donald trump” for both. The
Database module is responsible for handling interactions with
the database. Finally, the data is ready for the similarity check
and after measuring (Section IV-C), the Database module will
update the documents with the calculated values.
C. Similarity Measures
Username, Display name, and Bio are all collections of
strings, so to examine and rank the similarity, we can apply
similarity measure algorithms. We employed two well-known
similarity measures, Cosine and Euclidean, and found the
Cosine results, in the Vector Space Model for texts, were
better. Also, Cosine similarity is well-suited for use with very
high dimensional data.
For matching profile photos, we leveraged a known library
“Face Recognition” (github.com/ageitgey/facerecognition)
built with deep learning that has an accuracy of 99.38%
on face recognition. Accordingly, at first, each user’s photo
is examined whether a face exists in it or not. Next, the
unique features of that face are identified and finally, the
unique features of that face correlated the account holder’s
face are compared to recognize the person. We gave the
actual profile photo of Donald J. Trump, Barack Obama,
and Emmanuel Macron as the input to this library. The final
output is delivered as a Boolean. “True” is the same person
with equivalent facial features.
D. Modeling and Classification
We modelled the three first above-mentioned features in
the Vector Space and applied TF-IDF transformation. This
TABLE II
TOTAL TARGET POPULATION, NUMBER OF IDENTIFIED SIMILAR
ACCOUNTS BASED ON THE DEFINED SIMILARITY METRICS.
D. Trump B. Obama E. Macron
#impersonator accounts 108 38 21
similar #username 37 6 4
similar #full name 36 10 6
similar #bio 88 34 16
similar #photo 23 6 5
common in 1 metric 67 26 12
common in 2 metrics 13 4 4
common in 3 metrics 15 4 3
common in 4 metrics 13 4 2
made it possible to perform the calculations by employing
components from the NLTK and scikit-learn packages. For
obtaining similarity, we prepared a dictionary consisting of
unique words of the Username, plus Display Name and Bio
of each case. Trump’s dictionary holds “Donald J. Trump
45th President of the United States”, Obama consists “Barack
Obama 44th President of the United States”, and Macron
contains “Emmanuel Macron President de la Republique fran-
caise”.
Succeeding, we checked and matched each user profile
feature (Username, Display Name, and Biography) to this
dictionary to find any similarity. We made a ground truth
labelled data and after deep manual inspection on 150 similar
profiles, we obtained the best threshold for each case as 0.3,
0.3, and 0.35 are for Trump, Obama, and Macron sequentially.
Based on the proposed model and assumed metrics, we
count and cluster the impersonator users into few groups.
Profiles that have similarity in a) 1 metric, b) two metrics,
c) three metrics, d) and in 4 distinct metrics. Profiles with
more similarity metrics are impersonating the genuine account
more. The summary of findings is presented in Table II.
The “#impersonator accounts” in the table shows the cu-
mulative amount of impersonators in each case. The number
of Trump imposters is much larger than that of the other two.
Each metric with its quantity is presented in the second part
of the table. Throughout the crawled profiles, Trump has the
largest numbers in all metrics, and Macron has the lowest.
Interestingly, in all three use cases, the most similarity is in the
biography feature. In the last part, we calculated the profiles
that own similarity in more than one metric.
V. CHARACTERIZATION OF IDENTIFIED ACCOUNTS
A. Profile Characteristics
After discovering the imposters, we dive into their profile
characteristics to recognize and compare their features. Figure
3 shows the number of imposters Followers and Followees.
The first observation is the highest density of dots is in
the middle area (10ˆ3 both followers and followees) which
indicates most of the impersonators have a lot of followers and
followees at the same time. It is a remarkable characteristic.
Surprisingly, most of the imposters in all three cases have
almost the same number of followers and followees. Further-
more, this trend continues as it increases, which indicates that
they follow more as their followers grow. We can also see that
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Fig. 3. Portion Follower vs. Followee in identified impersonator profiles.
some imposters have a higher number of followees rather than
their followers, meaning they are following more.
Table III explores other features from imposters. The first
section explains how many public profiles exist among im-
personators and Trump owns the higher frequency. Moreover,
the average number of the followers, followees, and media
count are provided. In the case of the follower, while Trump
and Macron imposters have a very high amount, Obama’s
imposters have approximately half that amount. As for the
number of followees, Macron’s imposters have even more.
And for the amount of published media, Obama impersonators
are in the lead.
TABLE III
IMPOSTERS PROFILE CHARACTERISTICS
D. Trump B. Obama E. Macron
#public profile 46 14 4
avg #follower 1407 628 1369
avg #followee 491 652 812
avg #media count 214 272 155
avg bio #lengtha 8.33 4.9 5.2
bio related #hashtagb 0.26 0 0.6
bio related #mentionedc 0.16 0.15 0.13
a in words. b Related hashtag in bio. c Related user mentioned in bio.
In the second part of Table III, we examined the imperson-
ator’s biography. On average, Trump’s imposters have longer
biographies. Generally, in bio, there are four ways of promot-
ing that are visible for everyone. Imposters are promoting by
a) putting a hashtag starting with #, b) mentioning some user
starting with @, c) expressing feeling by placing some words
as text, d) or including URL address. For example, in the case
of Trump, impersonators are promoting the upcoming 2020 US
Presidential election using hashtag “votefordonaldtrump2020”
or by mentioning (@realdonaldtrump). We count and display
these in this part of the table (we do not consider URL
addresses). On medium, while Macron’s imposters hold more
related hashtag, Trump’s impersonators are mentioning the
genuine account higher.
B. Activity Characteristics
After identifying impersonators, now we cover their ac-
tivities. In 3 months activity, the average comments posted
by imposters are 2.79, 1, and 1 for Trump, Obama, and
Macron cases. Clearly, Trump’s imposters have more activities.
Furthermore, the average like caught by imposters are 13.6,
1.7, and 6.7 respectively. This means imposters favoured to
do like rather than post a comment. Next, we did a manual
check and investigated the post of the imposters to know if
they are sharing the same posts (of the genuine account) or
not. Interestingly, we discovered some are duplicating up to
60%. Among three cases, Trump’s imposters duplicated more.
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Fig. 4. Comparision of some Profile Features.
In Figure 4 by comparing the imposter’s accounts in 3
use cases, we observe almost the same pattern with minor
differences. In term of followers, Obama and Macron imper-
sonators have the wider range than Trump. All three groups
are following around 500 users in the median and 1000 on
average. Surprisingly, the range and the median of Trump
imposters are similar to all, but there is a tiny difference in
average.
In term of followees, median and average numbers in all
cases are approximately equal which means the impersonators
do not have a strange number of followees. Furthermore, the
range of 3 cases are wider than all users. And in shared media,
normally all cases are posting between the range of 5 to 250.
In this feature, again we can see the behaviour of Trump’s
imposters is highly similar to all users.
Next, we desire to know when impersonators are comment-
ing? and compared to others, what is the rate? So, Figure
5 presents the age comments that are published. Plot a) is
the cumulative distribution of the age of the comments (hour)
which compared imposters to the whole dataset. For better
presentation, we limit the figure in the x-axis. Nearly 30%
of the comments (for both) are posted in the first hour. As it
continues, imposters comment more, and in the first 10 hours,
they posted 80% of their total comments, while this number
is around 60% for others. This means imposters, in term of
commenting, are really engaged in the first 10 hours.
The second Figure 5.b is the Boxplot representation of the
age of the comments (minutes). As it can be seen, the range
of all group is wider than imposters. Also Imposters, in the
median commented by the minute 100, while others posted by
the minute 250. The average point for both groups is large.
For better distinction of comments that are issued, we
calculate the average published time of the comments per
unique user and plot it on Figure 6. By considering the first
hour, while on average 60% of the imposter’s comments are
issued, others are publishing less than 30% of their total.
Furthermore, nearly 90% of the imposter’s comments are
published on the first day, but this number is around 80%
for other. This means imposters are eager to comment really
quick (abnormal activity). So, from the perspective of traffic
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Fig. 5. Age of the posted comment earned by all users vs imposters.
management, they are producing huge network traffic and in
a large-scale format that could contribute to traffic jams.
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Fig. 6. CDF of the average of the comments posted by unique users.
C. Impersonator Categorization
Based on impersonator profile characteristics and their ac-
tivities, four clusters as follow has been made that potentially
have different motivations, aims, and behaviour (see Table
IV):
• Active Bot are those accounts that have unique charac-
teristics and are of high interest for us. Public profile,
similarity at least in 2 metrics, similar photo, high rate
of followers and followees are unique specialities. Active
Bots duplicate more than 50% of the genuine account
posts. For monitoring this, we did the manual check of
all the imposters shared-post.
• Inactive Bot are generally considered another type of
bots. The profile could be public or private, there is no
published post, the rate of followers and followees are
low and they have similarity at least in two metrics.
• Fan / Opposition generally supports or opposes that po-
litical figure. Features including public profile, similarity
in at least 2 metrics, high number of the followers, low
amount of followees, and similarity in profile photo are
linked with this group. In some cases, they are using the
flag of the country as the profile photo. Furthermore, they
are duplicating roundly 30% of the posts.
• Ordinary Users also exist with a simple motivation in
mind which is to support the favourite political figure.
Generally, they show the support by mentioning the
username (of genuine account) or adding hashtags (like
makeamericagreatagain) or writing some words in bio.
So, the only similarity is in just 1 metric. The range of
followers and followees are normal.
D. Short dive on Bot activities
On Instagram, bots could have different aims and be-
haviours. Inactive Bots, as they have very weak profiles (low
TABLE IV
IMPOSTER CATEGORIZATION
Profile Characteristics Similarity Activity
Follower Followee MediaCount Public Username
Display
Name Bio Photo
Least
Common
Metrics
Most
Common
Metrics
Duplication
Rate
Active Bot >1k >1k >10 Y Y/N Y/N Y/N Y 2 4 >50%
Inactive Bots <100 <100 <5 Y/N Y/N Y Y Y/N 2 4 -
Fan/Opposition >500 <100 >50 Y Y/N Y/N Y Y 2 3 <30%
Ordinary Users 50<&<1k 50<& <1k 5<&<100 Y/N N N Y N 1 1 -
followee rate, no post, no profile picture) are not followed by
the human. As we found, they are active to Like or Comment
in favour of supporting or opposing someone. On the other
hand, Active Bots hold better profiles (in term of features)
and have a large number of followers and followees. Therefore
they can be followed by humans or other bots (or a network
of bots). Additionally, based on our manual inspection we
identified that both Active and Inactive Bots are posting the
same comment several times on different posts (in the first
hour). It is an apparent behaviour of automated bots that
are programmed to Comment. So, they are giving the fake
visibility or fake popularity.
On other end, Fan/Opposition accounts have unique fea-
tures. For example, they own a reasonable quantity of follow-
ers and do not follow a lot of pages. They are being followed
by humans too. This sounds reasonable because at first, people
like to follow the news of their favourite figure and in most
cases, Fan Pages are covering the news better than the actual
account. Secondly, sometimes the actual figure does not have
any official page and as a result, fan pages will flourish. As
we found, Fan Pages can be controlled by Machine or Human.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we did an analysis to discover impersonators
based on the reactions on the published posts of top politician
figures on Instagram. To our knowledge, this is the first
paper that conducts such analysis on Instagram data. We have
explained how imposters are identified and what features are
considered. Based on user profiles and user activities, we
achieve four different categories of imposters with different
characteristics. We also showed impersonators and political
bots are eager to comment in the early hours of a published
post, and most of them have a normal number of followers,
followees, and shared media. As a future direction, at first, we
aim to handle the problem of fake account identification as a
machine learning problem in a large-scale format and also, we
intend to improve the detection by considering more features
such as Stories (media that vanish after 24 hours) and IGTV
(long-form video service) on Instagram. Next, we can move to
shared-posts of impersonators to study their behaviours. Also,
we can do cross users analysis and by extending this model
we are able to identify aggressive political parties or people
who aim to destroy the opposite parties by their activities.
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